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IMPLIED CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the Act) was enacted by Con-
gress in order "to protect the public and investors against malpractice
in the securities and financial markets."12 Its provisions were designed
to eliminate undesirable practices in the trading of securities, to restore
confidence in securities markets, and to protect the investing public.
3
As originally enacted, these purposes were to be achieved by imposing
upon the Securities and Exchange Commission the responsibility of reg-
ulating the activities of broker-dealers who dealt in the over-the-counter
markets and by charging various stock exchanges with the responsi-
bility of regulating their members.4
When the task of direct regulation of all broker-dealers trading in
the over-the-counter markets proved to be too burdensome for the
SEC,5 Congress responded by amending the Act in 1938.0 The
amendments provided that voluntary securities associations, comprised
of broker-dealers who dealt in the over-the-counter markets, should be
formed to carry the primary responsibility for regulating the activities
of any broker-dealer who chose to associate with any such securities
association.7 Each association would be required to register with the
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970). See generally 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 20,001-
26,992; E. GADSBY, THE FEDERAL EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1966); W. MARTIN, THE SE-
CURITIES MARKETS; A REPORT, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1971); E. McCoRmICK, UN-
DERSTANDING THE SECURrrIEs ACTS AND THE S.E.C. (1948); C. MEYER, THE SECURTIMS
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 ANALYZED AND EXPLAINED (1934).
2. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3016 (1964) [herein-
after cited as CONG. NEWs].
3. Id.
4. SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcumrr MAmETS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 541
(1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
5. Id. pt. 4, at 604.
6. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3
(1970). For legislative history of thesd amendments, see S. REP. No. 1455 and H.R.
REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
7. See S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1963). See generally MacLean,
Broker's Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DENVER L.J. 63, 75
(1970) [hereinafter cited as MacLean]; Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under
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SEC, to organize in a prescribed manner, to adopt rules designed to
meet certain standards, and to agree to discipline members who vio-
late its rules.8
This self-regulatory scheme operated substantially without change
until 1964.9 The Act was then amended to allow the SEC to regulate
broker-dealers who were neither members of a stock exchange nor
members of the only voluntary association of securities dealers to be
registered with the SEC, the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc. (the NASD).10 The purpose of this change was to preserve
the voluntary nature of the NASD and, at the same time, to insure that
all broker-dealers were subject to similar regulation.'1
Furthermore, the SEC's power was expanded in response to a need
for closer regulation of the NASD and its members.'" It was given
new administrative powers to censure, bar, or suspend an individual
employee of a broker-dealer rather than just the firm itself.'" The
SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 AtA. L. REv. 15, 15-19 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Rediker].
8. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3
(1970).
9. 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 25,592, at 18,576 (1972); SPECIAL STUDY, supra note
4, pt. 4, at 604-608; MacLean, supra note 7, at 65 n.13.
10. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 570, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(b)(10) (1970). The SEC's jurisdiction over broker-dealers who are neither members
of the NASD nor a stock exchange has been called "SECO" (i.e., SEC regulated only).
Thus the rules adopted by the SEC pursuant to this section have been referred to as
the SECO rules.
11. Section 15(b)(10) (15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(10) (1970)) is based in large part upon
the requirements imposed upon a securities association by section 15A(b) (8) (15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b)(8) (1970)) of the Exchange Act with respect to its membership and is nec-
essary to insure that those brokers and dealers who choose not to belong to an associa-
tion will be subject to regulation in those areas by the Commission. H.R. REP. No.
1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964).
12. See, e.g., SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 330 (recommendation 7).
13. Section 15(b)(7)-(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7)-(10) (1970). These sections
provide:
(7) The Commission may, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hear-
ing, by order censure any person, or bar or suspend for a period not exceed-
ing twelve months any person from being associated with a broker or dealer,
if the Commission finds that such censure, barring, or suspension is in the public
interest and that such person has committed or omitted any act or omission enu-
merated in clause (A), (D) or (E) of paragraph (5) of this subsection or has been
convicted of any offense specified in clause (B) of said paragraph (5) within ten
years of the commencement of the proceedings under this paragraph or is enjoined
from any action, conduct, or practice specified in clause (C) of said paragraph (5).
It shall be unlawful for any person as to whom such an order barring or suspending
him from being associated with a broker or dealer is in effect, willfully to become,
or to be, associated with a broker or dealer, without the consent of the Commission,
and it shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to permit such a person to become,
or remain, a person associated with him, without thc i nosent of the Commission,
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1964 Amendments further granted the SEC broader powers to alter or
supplement NASD rules relating to organization, discipline, and eligi-
bility for membership, 14 and the power to review and to set aside any
actions by the NASD. 15
if such broker or dealer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known, of such order.
(8) No broker or dealer registered under this section [section 15] shall, during
any period when it is not a member of a securities association registered with the
Commission under section 78o-3 [section 15A] of this title, effect any transaction in,
or induce the purchase or sale of, any security (otherwise than on a national securi-
ties exchange) unless such broker or dealer and all natural persons associated with
such broker or dealer meet such specified and appropriate standards with respect to
training, experience, and such other qualifications as the Commission finds necessary
or desirable. The Commission shall establish such standards by rules and regula-
tions, which may-
(A) appropriately classify brokers and dealers and persons associated with
brokers and dealers (taking into account relevant matters, including types of busi-
ness done and nature of securities sold).
(B) specify that all or any portion of such standards shall be applicable to any
such class.
(C) require persons in any such class to pass examinations prescribed in ac-
cordance with such rules and regulations.
(D) provide that persons in any such class other than a broker or a dealer
and partners, officers, and supervisory employees (which latter term may be de-
fined by the Commission's rules and regulations and as so defined shall include
branch managers of brokers or dealers) of brokers or dealers, may be qualified
solely on the basis of compliance with such specified standards of training and
such other qualifications as the Commission finds appropriate.
The Commission may prescribe by rules and regulations reasonable fees and charges
to defray its costs in carrying out this paragraph, including, but not limited to, fees
for any examination administered by it, or under its direction. The Commission
may cooperate with securities associations registered under section 15A of this title
and with national securities exchanges in administering examinations and may re-
quire brokers and dealers subject to this paragraph and persons associated with such
brokers and dealers to pass examinations administered by or on behalf of any such
association or exchange and to pay to such association or exchange reasonable fees
or charges to defray the costs incurred by such association or exchange in adminis-
tering such examinations.
(9) In addition to the fees and charges authorized by paragraph (8), each
broker or dealer registered under this section [section 15] not a member of a securi-
ties association registered pursuant to section 78o-3 [section 15A] of this title shall
pay to the Commission such reasonable fees and charges as may be necessary to de-
fray the costs of additional regulatory duties required to be performed by the Com-
mission because such broker or dealer is not a member of such a securities associa-
tion. The Commission shall establish such fees and charges by rules and regulations.
(10) No broker or dealer subject to paragraph (8) of this subsection shall
effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase or sale of, any security (oth-
erwise than on a national securities exchange) in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe designed to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to provide safeguards against unreasonable profits or unreason-
able rates of commissions or other charges, and in general, to protect investors and
the public interest, and to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of
a free and open market.
See Rediker, supra note 7, at 22-23, where it is concluded that the adoption of this
amendment evinces a congressional intent to grant the SEC a voice at least equal to
that of the NASD's in the formulation and application of ethical standards of conduct
for broker-dealers.
14. Section 15A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k) (1970).
J5. .eetiqn 15A(g) & (h), 15 U.S.Q. § 78o-3(g) & (h) (1970).
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Concomitant with the congressional trend of increased regulation
of broker-dealers to make more effective the purposes of the Act is the
judicial trend to grant additional rights of recovery to the public in-
vestor for breaches of the dictates of the Act and the rules promul-
gated thereunder. Although the Act fails specifically to grant a private
cause of action to recover damages incurred when a person violates
certain sections of the Act, the courts generally have not been hesitant
to find that one does exist by implication."8 In allowing an implied
cause of action for violation of the proxy rules, the Supreme Court
stated in its landmark opinion, J.l. Case Co. v. Borak,'7 that:
While this language [section 14 of the Act] makes no specific refer-
ence to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is "the pro-
tection of investors," which certainly implies the availability of judicial
relief where necessary to achieve that result.
We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it is the duty
of .the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose.18
Judicial recognition of an implied civil remedy where necessary
for the protection of public investors, coupled with the 1964 amend-
ments which expanded effective control over the securities industry,
raises an interesting question: Should a private right of action also
exist for violation of the rules promulgated by the NASD1' pursuant
to the authority granted in section 15A (b) (8)20 of the Act?
16. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (granting a private cause of action
to those injured by one who violated the requirements of section 14 of the Act); Tun-
stall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineermen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944)
(implied cause of action for brotherhood's violation of Railway Labor Act); Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (granting a private
remedy against a stock exchange for failure to discipline its members as required by sec-
tion 6(b) of the Act); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946) (implying a civil remedy for violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 pro-
mulgated thereunder).
17. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See generally Note, Violation of Proxy Rules: Private
Right of Action, 50 CoRNELL L.Q. 370 (1965); Note, Civil Liability and Appropriate
Remedies Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 Nw. U.L.
REv. 809 (1965); Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of I.1. Case
v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1150 (1965); 64 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1336 (1964); 78 Hav.
L. REv. 296 (1964).
18. 377 U.S. at 432-33 (emphasis added).
19. CCH NASD MANutAL IT 2151-78 [hereinafter cited as MANuAL].
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (8) (1970) provides:
An applicant association shall not be registered as a national securities associ-
ation unless it appears to the Commission that the rules of the association are
[Vol. 8
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This Comment will argue that a broker-dealer should be subjected
to liability for losses proximately caused by his negligent or fraudulent
violations of a specific rule of the NASD enacted for the purpose of in-
vestor protection. Such a remedy would be consistent with the Act's
purpose of protecting the investing public, with the congressional in-
tent to provide effective enforcement of the provisions of the Act, and
with the judicial resolve to make effective the purposes of congressional
enactments.
1. NASD: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Under present practice, the remedy of an investor who is harmed by
a member firm's violation of NASD rules is to file a written complaint
with one of the NASYs District Business Conduct Committees.2' A
copy of these allegations is forwarded to the member firm and the lat-
ter is given an opportunity to file a written reply.2" Either party, or
the committee itself, may request a hearing."3 After due deliberations,
the district committee is empowered to render a decision and affix a
penalty.24  These decisions may be appealed to the NASD's Board of
Governors2 5 and ultimately to the SEC.2 6  While this procedure ap-
pears adequate to protect the public investor, there is one crucial omis-
sion. All of the permissible penalties-censure, fine, suspension, ex-
pulsion, revocation-while sufficient to punish the member firm or
the individual broker, make no provision for awarding damages to
the aggrieved investor.27 As the Report of Special Study of Securities
Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission has emphasized:
,[A]lthough NASD staff and committee officials may offer a degree of
assistance in the preparation of formal complaints and prosecution of
the case, the responsibility for proceeding and carrying the case forward
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote
just and equitable principles of trade, to provide safeguards against unreasonable
profits, or unreasonable rates of commissions or other charges and, in general,
to protect investors and the public interest, and to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market; and are not designed to permit
unfair discrimination between customers or issuers, or brokers or dealers, to
fix minimum profits, to impose any schedule of prices, or to impose any schedule or
fix minimum rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other charges.
21. NASD Code of Procedure § 4, MANuAL, supra note 19, 3004.
22. NASD Code of Procedure 99 6-7, MANUAL, supra note 19, 3006.
23. NASD Code of Procedure § 8, MANuAL, supra note 19, 3008.
24. NASD Code of Procedure § 11, MANUAL, supra note 19, 13011.
25. NASD Code of Procedure § 15(a), MANUAL, supra note 19, 3014.
26. NASD Code of Procedure § 20, MANUAL, supra note 19, 3019,.
27. Rule 1 of Article V of NASD Rules of Fair Practice, MANUAL, supra note 19,
2301.
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lies largely with the public complainant. Many potential complainants
are unquestionably discouraged from going forward by the burdens in-
volved in assuming that role, especially since this procedure will not re-
sult in restitution or other benefit to the complainant.28
With the public reluctant to utilize this form of private complaint,
it seems clear that many abusive practices are not brought to the atten-
tion of the regulatory agency or association and, hence, go unpun-
ished.29 The SEC and NASD cannot possibly maintain adequate su-
pervision of all the numerous transactions in which broker-dealers en-
gage."' The Borak Court specifically cited this as a basis for implying
a civil remedy for violations of the proxy rules: inability of the SEC
to investigate adequately all of the statements made in the many proxy
statements filed with the SEC each year."1
The Borak Court felt that, if an injured shareholder could secure
reimbursement of losses which were caused by a false or misleading
proxy statement, the shareholder would be more apt to police its ac-
curacy.32  With public awareness stimulated, those drafting proxy
statements would tend to exercise a greater degree of care to insure
accurate disclosures; hence, the congressional purpose of meaningful
disclosures would be enhanced and strengthened. 3
The congressional intent to regulate broker-dealer conduct in the
over-the-counter markets would be equally strengthened and enhanced
with the creation of a civil remedy to compensate injured investors.
With the increased liability for violation of a rule and with the increased
chance of a violation being reported to either the SEC or NASD, a
broker-dealer may be less likely to engage in conduct which he knows,
or should know, contravenes the rules of the NASD.
According to Borak, however, adequacy of existing remedies is only
one test to be met before a civil remedy will be implied by the courts.
Congressional intent in granting the enabling power to promulgate
28. SPFcrAL STUoY, supra note 4, pt. 4, at 664.
29. Id. pt. 1, at 328; Rediker, supra note 7, at 39. The Special Study frequently
notes that many abusive practices go unpunished. "The adequacy of the substantive
rules which delineate legal and ethical standards of selling in the industry are not always
matched either by the techniques available to detect violations or the enforcement action
applied after detection." SPECIAL STuDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 328.
30. During 1973, there were 4,053,200,000 transactions in the National Over-the-
Counter securities market. THE Dow JoNEs INVETORS HANDBoo 67 (1974).
31. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
32. Id. at 432.
33. Id.
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rules governing broker-dealer conduct must also be considered.3 4  The
congressional intent in Borak which justified implication of a private
cause of action was the intention of Congress to protect the public.
It can be argued that the same purpose motivated Congress in en-
acting section 15A of the Act. Section 15A(b)(8) of the Act provides,
in part, that the rules of the association must be designed "to protect
investors and the public interest," 35 and Congress explicitly stated
that one of its purposes was to provide protection to the investor and to
the public.3 6  Further, when Congress stated in enacting the 1964
amendments that its purpose was "[t]o extend to investors in certain
over-the-counter securities the same protection now afforded to those in
listed securities,"' 7 by implication, it was declaring the purpose of exist-
ing regulation to be the protection of the public.
Although it is clear that the Act's purpose is investor protection, it
is equally clear that neither statutory constructions8 nor legislative his-
tory3 9 explicitly supports a civil cause of action. Thus, the broker-
dealer concerned about the extent of his potential liability and the in-
vestor concerned about his legal rights to recoup any losses that he may
sustain due to acts of a broker-dealer must turn to judicial responses to
determine whether or not a private cause of action for breach of NASD
rules has been added to the arsenal of weapons for the enforcement
of such rules. Both the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals
have faced the question.40
II. THE SECOND CiRcuiT'S RESPONSE: THE IMPLICATION
OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
The first and leading case to confront the issue of implied civil
34. Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (8) (1970). See note 20 supra.
36. CONG. NEWS, supra note 2, at 3013-14, 3016.
37. Id. at 3013.
38. See Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets:
Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 633, 635-42 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Lowenfels]; Rediker, ,upra note 7, at 31-34.
39. See Lowenfels, supra note 38, at 642. Lowenfels reaches this conclusion after
having reviewed the Senate and House Reports, which dealt with the purpose and back-
ground of the Act and the floor debates regarding adoption of the Act. Since none of
these sources made any mention of whether section 15A should be a basis for a private
cause of action, a definitive conclusion as to the congressional intent on the question
cannot be made.
40. Averm Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.s. 963
(1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966).
1975]
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liability arising from violations of NASD rules is Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Bache & Co.41 In Colonial, the plaintiff sued for damages sustained
when its broker sold certain of its equity securities to meet margin re-
quirements, which exceeded those agreed upon between the broker
and plaintiff, and in excess of those required by the stock exchange. 42
It contended that, since defendant had engaged in conduct which was
not in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade and there-
fore in violation of section 1 of article I of the Rules of Fair Prac-
tice of the NASD,43 the defendant should be liable for all damages
proximately caused thereby.44 The court, however, rejected plaintiff's
assertion that a violation of a NASD rule per se is sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action.45  Nevertheless, the court, in an opinion by
Judge Friendly, did formulate a test to determine the circumstances
under which a civil remedy under section 15A of the Act would be
implied.46
The court's analysis was premised on the theory that the implica-
tion of a private right of action rests upon the duty of the courts to
make effective the policy of a statute. This duty may be suggested in
either one of two circumstances: (1) where there exists an "explicit
statutory condemnation of certain conduct and a general grant of ju-
risdiction to enforce liabilities created by the statute, as in cases under
section 10 and section 14 of the Act,"47 or (2) where the existing rem-
edies, judicial and administrative, are ineffective to achieve the pro-
41. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
42. Id. at 179.
43. Article m, section 1 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD provides: "A
member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade." MANUAL, supra note 19, % 2151.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant's behavior was in violation of article XIV of
the constitution of the New York Stock Exchange which also prohibits conduct incon-
sistent with just and equitable principles of trade. The question of an implied cause of
action for violations of the rules of the New York Stock Exchange is substantially
the same for that of violations of the rules of the NASD. 358 F.2d at 181-82.
44. 358 F.2d at 180-81.
45. Id. at 182.
46. Id. See notes 6-15 supra and accompanying text.
47. 358 F.2d at 181. For discussion of the implication of a private remedy based
upon section 10(b), see Klein, Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities
Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 20 U. MiAMr L. REV. 81 (1965); Note, Private Reme-
dies Available Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620 (1966); Note, Civil Liability Under
Section lob and Rule 10b-5, 74 YALE L.L 658 (1965). For a discussion of the implica-
tion of a private remedy based upon section 14(a), see sources enumerated in note 17
supra.
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tection intended by Congress. 48
Proceeding to examine the nature of the NASD rule,49 the court con-
cluded that "whether the courts are to imply federal civil liability for
violation of . . . dealer association rules by a member cannot be de-
termined on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis .. "..",50 Indeed, it
expressly rejected the contention that a violation of NASD rules is never
actionable, stating:
The court must look to the nature of the particular rule and its place in
the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication of a federal
liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when
the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for impli-
cation would be strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty un-
known to the common law.5'
Thus, the Colonial court held that the plaintiff did not satisfy the
requisite burden of proof because the rules alleged to have been vio-
lated were "something of a catch-all which . . . preserves power to
discipline members for a wide variety of misconduct, including merely
unethical behavior which Congress could well not have intended to
give rise to a legal claim."5  Accordingly, in denying plaintiff's
claim, it held that the general business conduct rule of the NASD",
did not supply an adequate basis for the implication of a private rem-
edy for investors.5 4
What emerges from Colonial is a case by case determination of the
nature and place in the regulatory scheme of each specific rule, with
the burden of proof being lightest where the rule in issue imposes a
specific duty unknown at common law (e.g., the duty to recommend
securities which are suitable for a customer, which is now required of
48. 358 F.2d at 181.
49. Id. at 182.
50. Id.
51. Id. Other writers have suggested that the court formulated an additional test:
that the rule must be one which amounts to a substitution for SEC regulation itself. See
Rediker, supra note 7, at 49-50; Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied
Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative
Agency to Negate Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. REs.
L. REv. 925, 999 (1966). However, it does not appear that the court enumerated this
as a condition precedent to implication of civil liability, but rather employed it as one
indicator of the place the rule occupied in the statutory scheme.
52. 358 F.2d at 182. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 Hv. L. Rav. 285, 292 (1963).
53. See note 43 supra.
54. 358 F.2d at 183.
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broker-dealers by NASD rule 2 of article III of the Rules of Fair Prac-
tice).55  In determining the role the rule assumed in the statutory
scheme, the court focused upon whether or not the rule was one which
created a legal, as opposed to an ethical, standard.0 Implicit in the
court's holding is the conviction that voluntary dealer associations
were to regulate conduct of associated members to a greater extent
than they could or should be regulated under the law. 7 If the rule
was one enacted for the purpose of prescribing a general level of be-
havior for broker-dealers to observe, only intradisciplinary sanctions
should be employed in their enforcement.
The initial task in analyzing the nature of a rule, according to the
Colonial court, is to ascertain whether or not the NASD rule was in-
tended to impose a legal duty or merely a level of desired ethical be-
havior. The Colonial court, in answering that question, looked to the
55. This rule provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such cus-
tomer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
MANutAL, supra note 19, 11 2152.
56. 358 F.2d at 182.
57. There is much to support the contention that the NASD has in fact passed and
enforced rules governing ethical behavior of broker-dealers in areas which Congress did
not intend to grant the government power to regulate. When the Maloney Act (the
amendments to the 1934 Act adopted in 1938) was before Congress, William 0. Doug-
las, then Chairman of the SEC, stated that:
By and large, government can operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That
leaves untouched large areas of conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of gov-
ernment regulation but in fact too minute for satisfactory control; some of it lying
beyond the periphery of the law in the realm of ethics and morality. Into these
large areas self-government, and self-government alone can effectively reach.
Address Before the Bond Club of Hartford, Connecticut, Jan. 7, 1938, quoted in SPECIAL
StuIy, supra note 4, pt. 4, at 694-95. The Board of Governors of the NASD suggested
the same distinction when it stated: "Sales efforts must . . . be undertaken only on a
basis that can be judged as being within the ethical standards of the Association's rules
... ." Policy of the Board of Governors, MANUAL, supra note 19, 1 2152. Several
authors have argued that the legal-ethical distinction is a real one and that a breach of
rules of an ethical nature should not per se give rise to civil liability.
"Legal" requirements set forth a certain minimum standard of conduct, the failure
to comply with which is (or is regarded as) punishable in civil or criminal as well
as in administrative actions. "Ethical" responsibilities postulate a higher standard
of conduct than their "legal" counterparts. The duty to comply with ethical dictates
is largely voluntary and is (or is regarded as) punishable only through administra-
tive actions.
Rediker, supra note 7, at 16; see MacLean, supra note 7, at 75. But see Twomey
v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 721-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222,
234 (1968), where the court suggests that, while a legal-ethical characterization may
exist, it should not bear on the analysis of civil liability arising from the rules of the
NASD.
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specificity of the rule (a rule of law must be specific in its proscrip-
tion 8), the form of the rule (a law is generally a condemnation of
certain action rather than a command to act59), and whether or not the
rule existed at common law (if the duty was already in existence at
common law, sufficient redress for any damages would have been
available in state courts, so Congress would not have granted jurisdic-
tion to federal courts, which would rob state courts of their existing
power over such claims and which would flood federal courts with com-
mon law claims 0).
The validity of any ethical-legal dichotomy tends to lose some of its
force when one considers the fact that Congress has granted the SEC
power to enact rules regulating broker-dealers in the over-the-counter
markets who are non-members of the NASD which are the same as or
similar to the rules which the NASD has promulgated in the Rules of
Fair Practice. 1 If Congress at one time did intend the scope of the
voluntary securities dealers association to encompass areas beyond the
reach of the government's power to regulate, it may have manifested
a present intent to the contrary with the explicit grant of power to the
SEC to regulate the same conduct of broker-dealers not associated with
the NASD and with the grant of increased control over the formulation
and enforcement of the rules of the NASD.
Nevertheless, even if such a distinction is valid, it does not seem to
be a sufficient basis upon which to deny an injured investor a means
by which to recoup the losses occasioned by the broker-dealer's actions.
In Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc.,2 a California Court
of Appeal, in holding that the NASD Rules of Fair Practice were ad-
missible to establish a duty of a broker-dealer in proving negligence,
argued that
58. 358 F.2d at 182.
59. Id.
60. Id- If an implied cause of action is created, federal courts would have exclusive
jurisdiction over all such actions. 15 U.S.C. § 7Saa (1970).
61. MANuAL, supra note 19, [ 2151.
62. 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968). In Twomey, defendant had al-
legedly entered into a fiduciary relationship with plaintiff and then proceeded to act as
principal in many of the subsequent trading transactions for plaintiff's account without
disclosing the conflicting interests. Defendant also allegedly purchased highly specula-
five securities for plaintiff when she was a widow in need of a steady, secure income.
Plaintiff, in seeking to prove her allegation of negligent handling of her account, intro-
duced rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of Fair Practice into evidence to establish the duty
of a broker not to "churn" a customer's account and the duty to purchase securities
which are suitable for a customer's investment objectives. Id. at 697-99, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 228-29.
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,[i]t may be asserted that the proposed guidelines are merely ethical
standards and should not be a predicate for civil liability. Good ethics
should not be ignored by the law. It would be inconsistent to suggest
that a person should be defrocked as a member of his calling, and yet
not be liable for the injury which resulted from his acts or omissions. 6
Instead of focusing on the ethical-legal nature of a rule as the point
upon which liability should turn, it would seem more consistent with
the teachings of Borak, which Colonial purported to follow, and fairer
to injured investors, for liability to turn on the congressional purpose
of the Act and the adequacy of existing remedies to achieve that pur-
pose. This is not to argue that all rules of the NASD were enacted
for such purpose. 4 Both the rule-by-rule determination proposed by
Colonial"5 and its test devised to make that determination by looking to
the nature of the rule and its place in the regulatory scheme 0 should
be employed. But the particular nature and role of the rule which
Colonial established as a condition precedent to establishing liability
must be abandoned. To be consistent with judicial precedent and
congressional intent to enforce the Act effectively, the goal of the rule
should be protection of the public and the role of the rule should be
regulation of broker-dealer conduct toward that end.
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE
Other courts which have considered the question of civil liability
have followed the approach formulated in Colonial, but have de-
parted from Colonial's ethical-legal distinction when analyzing the
nature of the rule in issue. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,67 was the first
to consider the question after Colonial. Plaintiff, a trustee in bank-
ruptcy for Dobich Securities, Inc., alleged that defendant knowingly
allowed Dobich to open a cash account with fraudulently converted
property of various customers of Dobich, that this practice was a vio-
63. Id. at 721-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
64. One author has argued that the Rules of Fair Practice were enacted for the pur-
pose of providing protection to the public and that the rules of the NASD termed the
Uniform Practice Code were designed solely for purposes of internal housekeeping and,
hence, should never give rise to a private cause of action. Lowenfels, supra note 38,
at 650-54.
65. 358 F.2d at 182.
66. Id.
67. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
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lation of rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange,6" and that such
violation should give rise to a cause of action for damages. 9
The court, in determining whether or not a cause of action would
lie for breach of rule 405, adopted the test formulated in Colonial7
0
and then proceeded to supply its own determination of what the re-
quisite nature of a rule should be before it can be privately actionable.
"The touchstone for determining whether or not the violation of a par-
ticular rule is actionable should properly depend upon its design 'for
the direct protection of investors.' -71
Thus it appears that Colonial's requirement of an examination into
the legal or ethical nature of a rule has been dropped entirely by the
Seventh Circuit and the focus has been turned instead toward whether
or not the rule was designed for the protection of the investors. Fur-
ther, the Colonial requirement to consider the rule's specificity and
existence at common law has been abandoned by the Buttrey court.
Buttrey, while seemingly relaxing the Colonial test, added an addi-
tional burden that the plaintiff must meet before the court would allow a
cause of action for violation of any rule of an exchange or the NASD.
In each case it must be established that the offending behavior of the
broker-dealer constituted more than "mere errors of judgment."72  It
is uncertain exactly what level of conduct must be alleged, although
68. Rule 405 provides:
Every member organization is required through a general partner or an officer who
is holding voting stock to:
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer,
every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization
and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried
by such organization.
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the
organization.
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly after the
completion of any transaction for the account of or with a customer. ... The
member, general partner or officer. . . shall, prior to giving his approval, be per-
sonally informed as to the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature
of the proposed account and shall indicate his approval in writing on a document
which is a part of the permanent records of his office or organization.
CCH NEw YoRK SrocK EXCHANGE MANuAL 2405.
69. The courts have treated the question of a private cause of action arising from
stock exchange rules and one arising from NASD rules as substantially the same. But-
trey, although dealing with an implied cause of action based upon breach of exchange
rules, has been relied upon in subsequent cases dealing with NASD rules. See, e.g.,
Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963
(1969).
70. 410 F.2d at 142.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 143.
1975]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
the court indicated that strict liability would not be a basis for liability.7"
The court never reached the question of whether or not negligent vio-
lation of a rule would be sufficient since the plaintiff had alleged facts
which were "tantamount to fraud. 7 4
It would be consistent with the Buttrey holding and with the pur-
poses of the Act to permit a cause of action to lie for negligent trans-
gressions of the rules of NASD. If a rule is designed to protect the
public, 5 if the actions of a broker-dealer were such that a prudent
person in the same or similar circumstances could have reasonably fore-
seen that his actions would result in a breach of the rule, and if a mem-
ber of the public were injured thereby, it is logical and fair to shift the
loss from the investor to the broker-dealer who occasioned the loss.
Further, to permit a cause of action to lie only if a broker-dealer's be-
havior reaches a level of fraud would render the court's efforts to im-
ply a cause of action in this case meaningless since a cause of action
already exists for fraudulent acts under sections 10(b)
7 0 and 15(C) 77
of the Act.
Although the Seventh Circuit has subsequently decided two addi-
tional cases, Avern Trust v. Clarke 7  and SEC v. First Securities Co.,70
73. Id. The requisite level of culpability required to impose liability was never
reached by the Colonial court.
74. Id.
75. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
76. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970). For commentaries dealing with the implication of a private
cause of action arising from section 10(b), see note 47 supra.
77. Section 15(c)(1) provides:
No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or
sale of, any security (other than commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or com-
mercial bills) otherwise than on a national securities exchange, by means of any
manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance. The commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define such de-
vices or contrivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1970). This section was recognized as a basis for a civil cause
of action in Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 963 (1969).
78. 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1969).
79. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
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which dealt with the issue of an implied cause of action, the ques-
tion of the necessary level of offending behavior still remains unan-
swered. In Avern, the plaintiffs sued the defendant broker-dealer and
his firm for damages in fraud and breach of a fiduciary relationship
arising from a series of securities transactions which included making
recommendations without adequate disclosure of the "inherent risks"
and secretly dealing as a principal with the plaintiffs thereby maintain-
ing an inherent conflict of interest.s0 The plaintiffs alleged that,
since such behavior was in violation of sections 1, 2 and 18 of article
III of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD,8s they should be en-
titled to recoup the losses caused by ,defendant's purchases for plain-
tiffs' account.
The district court dismissed the claims based upon violation of the
NASD rules, but the Seventh Circuit, relying on Buttrey, concluded that,
although dismissal of such claims was erroneous as a matter of law,8"
it was not prejudicial since the "same claim" was incorporated under
plaintiffs' allegation of violation of section 15(c) of the Act 3 (the anti-
fraud provision for broker-dealers). The court cited Buttrey for the
proposition that violation of rules promulgated by self-regulatory agen-
cies can be a basis for civil liability if such rules are designed to pro-
tect the investing public.8 4 The court did not discuss the second Buttrey
requirement regarding the nature of the offending conduct of a broker-
dealer; however, apparently implicit in the court's conclusion-that
a cause of action for violation of a NASD rule is incorporated in a
cause of action for fraud-is the requirement that the offending
conduct be fraudulent. If negligent breach of a rule were sufficient,
the court could not have claimed that a cause of action based on sec-
tion 15(c) of the Act incorporated the same theory as one under the
NASD rules.8 5
In First Securities Co., Nay, the president and 92% owner of First
80. 415 F.2d at 1239.
81. Rule 1 of article III of the Rules of Fair Practice is set forth in note 43 supra.
Rule 2 of article I of the Rules of Fair Practice is set forth in note 55 supra. Rule
18 of Article III of the Rules of Fair Practice provides:
No member shall effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase or sale of, any
security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or con-
trivance.
MANuAL, supra note 19, 1 2168.
82. 415 F.2d at 1242.
83. Id. See note 77 supra for text of section 15(c) (1).
84. 415 F.2d at 1242.
85. Id.
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Securities, perpetrated a fraud on various customers of the firm by en-
ticing them to invest money in an investment opportunity so confiden-
tial that even the investors could not be informed of its nature.80 Nay
guaranteed that the investment would produce a specified annual
yield.sr Each customer was to make the check payable to Nay per-
sonally and to mail any checks to him in an envelope marked "Confi-
dential." '  Nay then used the money to make personal investments
and to repay personal debts.89 He paid the promised yield from his
personal funds to the extent that he could,00 and he prevented his firm
from discovering his fraud by forbidding any employee from opening
his mail.91 Later, Nay committed suicide, leaving a note which dis-
closed his scheme. 92 First Securities was sued by the defrauded in-
vestors for failure to adequately supervise Nay, which was in violation
of rule 27 of article HI of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
8
Without engaging in incisive analysis, the court, citing Avern and
Buttrey, concluded:
We have no doubt that the enforcement of Nay's rule regarding the
opening of mail is sufficient without more to constitute a violation of
Rule 27. Such violations provide a basis for private damage actions
where the rule violated serves to protect the public.94
The court dropped any reference to the test formulated in Colonial
and simply employed the "investor protection" test formulated in But-
t~ey.95 Again there was no mention of the nature of the violating
conduct. This may have been for one of two reasons: the nature of
the underlying acts for which First Securities was being held liable
was fraudulent; or the court felt that violation of the rule 27 was fraud-
86. 463 F.2d at 984.
87. id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 983.
90. Id. at 984.
91. Id. at 985.
92. Id. at 983.
93. Id. at 988. Rule 27 of article I of the Rules of Fair Practice provides, in perti-
nent part, that:
(a) Each member shall establish, maintain and enforce written procedures which
will enable it to supervise properly the activites of each registered representative and
associated person to assure compliance with applicable securities laws, rules, regu-
lations and statements of policy promulgated thereunder and with the rules of this
Association.
MANUAL, supra note 18, 2177.
94. 463 F.2d at 988,
9 .14
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ulent per se. The court offered no guidance as to whether it relied on
either ground in its omission of any express requirement of a level of
culpability or whether the nature of the defendant's conduct is no
longer relevant to the inquiry.
Only one district court case in the Seventh Circuit has dealt with the
subject subsequent to First Securities. In Rotstein v. Reynolds & Co.,9"
the court held that securities sold without regard to the "suitability" of
plaintiffs investment needs, in violation of rule 2 of article III of the
Rules of Fair Practice, gave rise to "a viable theory of recovery.
97
However, the plaintiffs cause of action was dismissed because his alle-
gations were insufficient to show that the stock was in fact unsuitable.98
The court made no reference to a requirement of establishing the
culpability of a defendant's behavior as required by Buttrey.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS
Thus far, there have been formulated two separate and inconsistent
tests by which to determine whether or not a private federal remedy for
damages will be implied for breach of the rules of the NASD. Although
no other circuit court has yet considered the question, two district
courts, one in the Ninth Circuit and one in the Fifth Circuit, have ex-
pressly confronted the question. Interestingly, the approach adopted
by the courts was the incorporation of the standards of Colonial and But-
trey, producing a much stricter test than the one obtained under either
of the cases alone.
In Wells v. Blythe & Co.,99 the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California was faced with the identical question presented in
Avern: whether or not violation of rule 2, article II of the NASD Rules
of Fair Practice gives rise to civil liability. 100 Plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant broker-dealer's negligent failure to counsel them to sell
their securities caused a $14,000 investment loss and that such practice
was in violation of rule 2's prescriptions. 10 The court first applied the
test formulated in Colonial,0 asserting that the rule in question must
play an integral part in the SEC's regulation and impose an explicit
96. 359 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
97. Id. at 114.
98. Id.
99. 351 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
100. See note 55 supra for text of rule 2 of article III.
101. 351 F. Supp. at 999.
102. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
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duty unknown to common law.10 3 The court then turned to Buttrey
to conclude that, since the plaintiffs did not allege facts tantamount to
fraud,104 no cause of action would be permitted.03
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in Mercury
Investment Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,10 was also faced with the
same question presented in Avern, violation of the NASD "suitability"
rule. 0 7 The court, although explicitly setting out the Colonial require-
ment, concluded, in direct contrast with Avern, that the nature of the
suitability rule was not such that it should give rise to civil liability. 08
The court held that the purpose of the Act was to prevent fraud, not
merely negligent transgressions:
Art. IH, See. 2 of the N.A.S.D. rules seeks to regulate a much broader
spectrum of broker activities than is envisioned by securities regulations.
Thus a violation of this N.A.S.D. rule. . . per se does not give rise to
federal civil liability under the Securities Act. 100
Both Wells and Mercury adopted Colonials approach, examining a
rule's nature and place within the regulatory scheme. But rather
than focusing on the ethical-legal nature of a rule in making that deter-
mination, the cases turned to the type of behavior sought to be regu-
lated. Each interpreted Buttrey as requiring the rule to be of a nature
designed to regulate fraudulent practices."10 The Buttrey holding,
however, is not so narrow, and, in fact, it is not clear whether negli-
gent behavior would satisfy the Buttrey requirement."' Subsequent
cases by the same court seem to have dropped such a requirement al-
together and determined, as did Buttrey, that whether or not a rule was
enacted for the purpose of protection of the public is the touchstone in
determining if a rule should be a basis for a private action."12
This combination of the requirements of Buttrey and Colonial ef-
fectively prevents implication of a private remedy arising from viola-
103. 351 F. Supp. at 1000-01.
104. Id. at 1002.
105. Id. at 1001-02.
106. 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
107. See note 55 supra for text of the "suitability" rule.
108. 295 F. Supp. at 1163.
109. Id.; see Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430-31 (N.D. Cal.
1968).
110. 295 F. Supp. at 1163; 351 F. Supp. at 1002.
111. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
112. SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
880 (1972); Rotstein v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. fIl. 1973).
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tion of a rule of the NASD to be relied upon by an injured investor
as a viable means of recovery. With the requirement that the rule be
of a nature to prevent fraudulent practices, there is no advantage in
alleging breach of an NASD rule as a cause of action. If a plaintiff
can successfully allege conduct amounting to fraud, he need not carry
the additional burden of establishing the specificity of a rule and its
absence at common law, but rather he need only allege violations of
section 10(b) or section 15(c) of the Act." 3 It is the plaintiff, in-
jured by negligent behavior of a broker-dealer which is in violation of
rules set down by the broker-dealer's own association, who is denied
satisfaction of his claim in federal court.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that much conflict and confusion still surround the very
important question of whether or not a cause of action for civil damages
will lie for a breach of the rules of the NASD. No definitive approach
to answer this question has yet been formulated by the courts. The
Second Circuit has determined that each rule should be examined to
determine whether the rule was intended to have imposed a legal duty
upon the broker-dealer or merely to have established a desired level
of behavior." 4 If the rule was of a nature intended to impose legal
obligations upon a broker-dealer, breach of the rule may give rise to
civil damages." 5 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has focused
on whether or not the rule was enacted for the protection of the pub-
lic."" if such is found to be the purpose of the rule, then violation of it
may properly give rise to a civil cause of action."1  Since the two tests
are quite different and would produce different results for plaintiffs
similarly situated, the divergence should be resolved. As a plaintiff's
legal rights should not turn upon the forum in which the suit is brought,
there is a pressing need for the Supreme Court to review the question
and formulate a single test for the circuits to apply.
Not only does confusion still surround the test to be employed, but
the degree of culpability which must be proved to impose liability re-
mains equally unclear. The Seventh Circuit has explicitly rejected
113. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 41-61 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 41-66 supra and accompanying text.
116. See notes 67-95 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 67-98, 112 supra and accompanying text.
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strict liability for breach of the rules of the NASD,118 but has not
settled whether an action will lie for a negligent breach; while a dis-
trict court in California and one in Texas have required the defendant's
actions to be tantamount to fraud." 9 A private action based on NASD
rules should lie for negligent breaches thereof in order to broaden the
substantive scope of investor protection, to further the means and ade-
quacy of enforcing the purposes of the Act, and to have the one who
occasioned a loss bear the responsibility.
Lucyann Swanburg
118. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
119. See notes 99-112 supra and accompanying text.
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